We need to elect some junk yard dogs to Congress

The general purposes of oversight — and what constitutes this function — can be stated in more specific terms. These terms unavoidably overlap because of the numerous and multifaceted dimensions of oversight. A brief list includes:

1. review the agency rule-making process;
2. monitor the use of contractors and consultants for government services;
3. encourage and promote cooperation between the branches;
4. examine agency personnel procedures;
5. acquire information useful in future policymaking;
6. investigate constituent complaints and media critiques;
7. assess whether program design and execution maximize the delivery of services to beneficiaries - governmental and private;
8. compare the effectiveness of one program with another;
9. protect agencies and programs against unjustified criticisms; and
10. study federal evaluation activities.

That's a lot of promises for 435 people on a couple of dozen committees to keep. So they don't, because they can't. The Congress wants the prestige of looking as if they do. Prestige is a poor substitute for power when the Executive branch needs all of the above done to it. And when the Congress launches a real investigation it seems that is the only thing it can do.

Nothing can be done about the number Senators to do the jobs. But the U.S. House of Representatives can be made larger. With more Congresspersons they could dig further afield and deeper. But, that it just about the last thing any President would tolerate. Which makes a good argument for doing it.

A larger House would cost more money. But we try it for ten years and see if they didn't recover all their costs and a lot more in cutting out Executive branch waste, fraud and abuse corruption. If they failed in ten years, the size of the House could be reduced in size after the next census. If they stopped just one military misadventure by the President they would have paid for themselves ten times over!

Flogging to be continued...

We need to elect some junk yard dogs to Congress

Part 2.
SOME HISTORICAL OPINIONS on the Watchdog function of Congress:

James Wilson (The Works of James Wilson, 1896, vol. II, p. 29), an architect of the Constitution and Associate Justice on the first Supreme Court:

"The house of representatives . . . form the grand inquest of the state. They will diligently inquire into grievances, arising both from men and things."

Woodrow Wilson (Congressional Government, 1885, p. 297), perhaps the first scholar to use the term “oversight” to refer to the review and investigation of the executive branch:

"Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration. It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function."

John Stuart Mill (Considerations on Representative Government, 1861, p. 104), British utilitarian philosopher:

". . . the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable . . ."

These are only samples of the weight of scholarly opinion. There is clearly agreement that the major focus of the Congressional investigative or 'oversight' function is the Executive Branch and the Presidency. It now seems that the last significant and effective oversight of the Executive Branch by the Congress was the Church committee of the U. S. Senate.

The Church Committee is the common term referring to the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, a U.S. Senate committee chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-ID) in 1975. A precursor to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the committee investigated intelligence gathering for illegality by the CIA and FBI after certain activities had been revealed by the Watergate affair.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church_Committee (05/22/2007)

"Committee subpoenas and contempt citations have been effective instruments for gaining access to executive branch documents that are initially withheld. The pressure that builds from these two techniques generally results in the Administration offering new accommodations to satisfy legislative needs. Although both branches at times seek assistance from the courts, the general message from federal judges is that an agreement hammered out between the two branches is better than a directive handed down by a court."

"Congress has as much right to agency documents for oversight purposes as it does for legislation. Executive claims of “deliberative process,” “enforcement sensitive,” “ongoing investigation,” or “foreign policy considerations” have not been, in themselves, adequate grounds for keeping documents from Congress. On the issue of withholding information from Congress, there are often sharp differences within an Administration, especially between the Justice Department and the agencies."

"Further, these case studies show that statutory language that authorizes withholding information from the public is not a legitimate reason for withholding information from Congress. Sharing sensitive information with congressional committees is not the same as sharing information with the public. Courts assume that congressional committees will exercise their powers responsibly. Legislative committees have demonstrated that they have reliable procedures for protecting confidentiality. Finally, congressional capacity to subpoena agency documents from private organizations is not an adequate substitute for receiving them directly from the agency."

Congressional Investigations: Subpoenas and Contempt Power
April 2, 2003
Congressional Research Service RL31836

When Congress doesn't find out something, it's because it doesn't really want to know. The public be damned.

See also: http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/code/title03/T03_Ch04.htm

To be continued...